The African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) was introduced in 2000 as the cornerstone of US development-oriented trade policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. It was designed to grant eligible countries duty-free access to the US market.
In February, President Donald Trump signed a one-year extension after the programme lapsed in September.
Yet the programme’s core benefit has already been effectively eliminated.
Since April, the US has imposed additional bilateral “reciprocal” tariffs ranging lately from 10% to 30% on countries eligible for the Agoa terms. Critically, Agoa only waives the standard tariff rate the US applies to all World Trade Organisation members (called the Most Favoured Nation tariff). This averaged just 3.3% in 2017.
The US Supreme Court struck down the much larger reciprocal surcharges on 20 February. But the White House responded immediately, imposing a 15% surcharge on most imports, effective 24 February for 150 days.
Agoa technically lives on after a one-year extension. But its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it.
As economists and trade modellers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability, we are interested in quantifying the effects of the changing US tariff regime. We ran a model that captures economy-wide adjustments across sectors and countries after a tariff shock via prices, production, consumption and trade diversion.
Our simulations show that new Trump-era tariffs drive large declines in US-bound exports from Africa. The steepest damage is in a few Agoa-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. Our results remain valid after the latest shift to the 15% tariff surcharge.
African exporters face substantial duties. Agoa offers only a modest advantage over other developing countries still subject to Most Favoured Nation status tariffs.
Thus, the promise of duty-free access has been hollowed out.
Our simulations of the “Liberation Day” tariff package – the April 2025 “America First” tariffs applied on top of Agoa expiry – show that Agoa-eligible countries do lose out, but the aggregate effect on all countries at large is relatively small.
Agoa countries’ exports to the US fall sharply by 34.7%. But in context of their global exports the decline equates only to 1.1%. Real GDP of Agoa-eligible countries remains largely unchanged.
Behind this average, however, some countries and sectors are hit hard. Lesotho’s total exports could drop by about 5.9%, Madagascar’s by 3.3%, and those of both Chad and Botswana by 1.9%.
Wearing apparel is the most affected sector: bilateral Agoa exports to the US fall by nearly half. For Madagascar and Mauritius, they are almost wiped out, with losses of roughly US$128.5 million and US$147 million, respectively.
According to our latest simulation updates accounting for the lower November 2025 tariff rates, negotiating tariff cuts with Washington or accepting US concessions seems to change little. Agoa-eligible countries still face a 9.2 percentage point rise in their trade-weighted average US tariff (vs 14.8 percentage points in April), leading to a fall of Agoa exports to the US by 9.6%.
Total exports in our simulation decline only by 0.7% as trade diversion to other markets offsets over 40% of US losses.
Even before the “Liberation Day” tariffs, Agoa’s effectiveness was limited. Our simulations of a simple shift from Agoa preferences to standard Most Favoured Nation tariffs show only modest impacts on beneficiary countries. Bilateral exports to the US fall by 3.7%, but total exports for Agoa-eligible countries decline by just 0.1%.
This underscores how little Agoa mattered for African trade growth on a larger scale.
This limited effectiveness stems from three main factors.
First, for most sub-Saharan African economies, the US is no longer the primary export destination. EU and Chinese markets have become more important.
Second, meeting Agoa’s rules of origin – if a product qualifies for the preferences based on the location of value creation – is often costly. In contrast, the tariff advantage has been narrow due to already low US Most Favoured Nation rates.
Third, uncertainty over programme renewals and eligibility reviews has long discouraged firms from investing in Agoa compliance.
To make the Agoa work for development again would require substantial reforms. These would need to include:
longer timelines and automatic continuation provisions
more predictable eligibility through transparent biennial reviews
updated rules of origin
broader coverage of increasingly important trade issues, such as digital trade, services, and non-tariff-related trade barriers.
The bipartisan Agoa Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 proposed some of these improvements, including a 16-year extension to 2041. But it stalled under the “America First” priorities.
In practice, deep reform looks unlikely amid volatile tariffs and short extensions, leaving Agoa increasingly irrelevant.
African policymakers must look elsewhere for new trade opportunities.
China’s new zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries beginning 1 May 2026 offers some relief from US protectionism.
Covering all tariff lines, it extends previous preferences for the continent’s 33 least developed countries to a much wider group of African partners. Middle-income exporters such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco stand to benefit. These countries previously faced Chinese tariffs of up to 25% on processed goods. They will now gain duty-free access on the same terms as the poorest African economies.
Such policies have boosted export diversification modestly for the least developed countries in the past. But the benefits will depend on product fit and value-chain dynamics. Until now, African exports to China have largely been dominated by low-value, primary products. African countries would need substantial investments to make use of preferential market access to China.
Beyond Chinese offers, the EU offers a stable partnership with substantial market scale. Its own unilateral tariff preferences through Generalised System of Preferences, Everything But Arms and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements provide more predictable access than the US tariff rollercoaster.
On top of this, the EU actively tries to pursue strategic alignment around critical raw materials, green energy and sustainable investment. It does this via Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships and Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements.
Developing countries, however, often criticise the EU sustainability measures or costly compliance to EU standards which worsen their trade opportunities. Hence, the EU has to find a better balance of its sustainable trade and development playbook to build trust with the global south.
African policymakers should seize this moment to build a foundation for a trade system that doesn’t depend on uncertain preferences and external policy shocks. Accelerating the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) serves as the most credible route to trade resilience, diversification and industrial upgrading.
The free trade area agreement can’t immediately replace US demand (different products, limited value-chain overlap). But it can reduce structural vulnerability to external shocks like US tariff volatility. - The Conversation
Vogel is a researcher and Olekseyuk G is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability
*The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of Independent Media