Attempted coupes in Africa call for counter-coup standby force

IN QUICK succession between 26 November and 7 December, Guinea Bissau and Benin further reinforced the fear of ‘coup epidemic’ and the severe trials of democracy in Africa.

Guinea-Bissau, a country long marked by political instability, has endured at least nine coup attempts and successful takeovers since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974.

The most recent crisis tagged a ‘sham coup’ unfolded on 26 November, when President Umaro Sissoco Embaló himself announced that a military takeover was underway. This occurred against the background of heightened political tension, particularly his fierce opposition with Fernando Dias da Costa in attaining electoral victory.

As the incident unfolded, soldiers stormed the headquarters of the electoral commission, destroying ballot boxes and further deepening public suspicion about the credibility of the process. The situation quickly attracted international attention.

Senegal’s Prime Minister, Ousmane Sonko, and former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, who was part of the electoral mission to the country, joined others in suggesting that the episode may have been orchestrated by Embaló in an unusual power-transition deal.

Indeed, this alleged coup seemed more like a ‘civilian handover’ and not a ‘military takeover’. African political elites never cease to astonish and perplex the world.

Meanwhile, the alleged coup plotters claimed their actions were intended to prevent Guinea-Bissau from descending into a major drug-trafficking hub, which has been a longstanding concern in the country’s political narrative.

In the aftermath, General Horta N’Tam was sworn in and promptly appointed 23 ministers and five secretaries of state to steer a one-year transitional government.

Public reaction, however, was sharply divided. Some citizens flooded the streets demanding the release of the disputed election results, while others, frustrated by deteriorating living conditions, welcomed the promise of change without condemning the coup itself.

In another dent of democratic rule in the West African region, Benin was thrust into turmoil on 7 December when President Patrice Talon announced that a coup attempt had been foiled, following hours of gunfire in Cotonou and the unusual presence of three Nigerian fighter jets circling Benin’s airspace.

The jets reportedly struck selected targets as part of counter-coup operations. Shortly after restoring calm, the government confirmed the arrest of 14 individuals accused of masterminding what President Talon described as an act of political “treachery.”

The leader of the coup d'état, Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri, operating under a newly established Military Committee for Refoundation, cited multiple grievances to justify the attempted takeover.

These included rising insecurity in northern Benin, cuts in essential health services, most notably the cancellation of state-funded dialysis, tax increases, political repression, and growing public disillusionment. The coup attempts also came on the heels of recent constitutional amendments, which extended the presidential mandate from five to seven years while retaining the two-term limit, a change that has stirred intense debate within the country.

Unlike earlier military incursions into politics in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which attracted no significant resistance from ECOWAS, the West Africa regional bloc responded to the latest crisis with unusual speed and firmness.

Determined to prevent further erosion of democratic rule in the region, the bloc deployed military forces from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire to secure critical installations and avert any renewed outbreak of violence or political sabotage. This forceful intervention was driven by mounting concerns over the growing number of member states succumbing to undemocratic reversals, as well as a desire to uphold the region’s hard-won democratic norms.

What are the immediate and remote implications of the growing boldness of the military to subvert democratic practices in the region? Indeed, the distorted power transition in Guinea-Bissau and the attempted coup in Benin carry far-reaching implications for both countries and the wider West African region.

First, military coups undermine democratic consolidation. Frequent interference by security forces, whether real or alleged, weakens public trust in electoral processes, civilian institutions, and constitutional rule. Military takeovers create an atmosphere of political uncertainty that discourages investment, disrupts economic activity, and heightens the risk of capital flight, worsening already fragile economic conditions. For instance, of Benin’s roughly 12 million people, about 7.9 million survive on less than the US$3.20 daily poverty benchmark.

Third, these crises expose state fragility, manifesting through deep governance deficits, including contested elections, weak oversight institutions, and politicised security sectors.

Such vulnerabilities make states more susceptible to manipulation by political elites and external actors.

Fourth, the spill-over effect puts other neighbouring countries at risk of military putsch. West Africa has experienced a troubling resurgence of military takeovers since 2020, and instability in one state often fuels a domino effect, especially where grievances are widespread.

Furthermore, these coups strain regional cooperation mechanisms within ECOWAS and the African Union (AU). Both institutions face mounting pressure to respond decisively, yet inconsistent reactions to past coups have weakened their credibility and democratic agency.

The situations in Guinea-Bissau and Benin therefore reinforce the urgent need for stronger democratic safeguards, more effective conflict-prevention measures, and meaningful institutional reforms that address governance failures at their root.

The military will always be tempted to seize opportunities when misgovernance, repression of civil liberties, electoral manipulation, and rising insecurity create deep public frustration.

Thus, both ECOWAS and the AU should begin considering the creation of a dedicated counter-coup standby force capable of responding swiftly to military takeovers and attempted coups.

While this offers important food for thought, the pressing question remains how to ensure that civilian governments uphold constitutional principles and resist efforts to undermine the will of the people through unconstitutional tenure extensions, democratic autocracy, and electoral malpractices.

Akinola is an Associate Professor and Research Coordinator in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg