Why Africa can no longer afford to outsource its security architecture

Adeoye O. Akinola

ON JUNE 17, the United Nations Working Group on “the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination” co-hosted a dialogue with the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) at the University of Johannesburg. 

The event, titled “Hybridisation in the Use of Violence: Emerging Trends in Mercenaries, Mercenary-Related Actors, and PMSCs”, explored the shifting dynamics of mercenaries and PMSCs in Africa, examining their historical evolution, contemporary manifestations, and the complex challenges of regulating their activities, with particular focus on protocol development and the role of civil society in influencing governance frameworks. 

Even as many now choose to feign ignorance of the undeniable presence of mercenaries and foreign fighters on African soil, and the havoc they continue to wreak, the revelation of nearly 300 Romanian mercenaries surrendering after being enlisted to fight alongside the national army in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in January this year, has served as a sobering reminder.

This development has reinforced the urgency to confront the alarming trend and nature of the externalisation of Africa’s peace and security architecture. Despite the prohibitions enshrined in the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the 1977 OAU/AU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, private military and security companies (PMSCs) continue to penetrate and entrench themselves within the security apparatus of states, notably in Mozambique and across the Sahel region.

While the meeting sought to draw out the perspectives of civil society actors on how foreign fighters continue to violate the human rights of citizens in affected countries globally, it is essential to interrogate the distinct realities of the African context, cautioning against universal assumptions about the role and capacity of civil society in confronting the activities of “soldiers of fortune.” 

In the Global North, where the headquarters of most PMSCs are located, mercenaries typically operate beyond national borders, engaging primarily in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

This external focus allows civil society actors in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, or France to exercise greater freedoms in assessing and responding to the use of PMSCs. By contrast, in the Global South, particularly in African states of the Sahel, mercenaries have become deeply embedded in national peace and security frameworks, creating perilous conditions that severely limit the ability of civil society to speak out, report on, or meaningfully engage with the activities of these foreign fighters on their soil. 

In countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, private military groups, most notably the Wagner Group (being replaced by African Corps), have become a cornerstone of military regimes, aiding in consolidating power while playing key roles in counterterrorism operations. Al Jazeera reported in March that between 1,000 and 1,500 Wagner fighters were active in Mali. 

What explains the resurgence of mercenaries in Africa? Among several factors, the meeting identifies Africa’s weak national institutions, coupled with the externalisation of its security, which have left the continent vulnerable to foreign exploitation, particularly by powers in North America and the Gulf.

Intense competition over critical minerals, a weakened UN regulatory system, the spread of terrorism, the rise of local militias and a resurgence of military rule and democratic autocracy further deepen instability, acting as some of the pull factors for the operation of PMSCs in Africa.

Though there is legitimate opposition to the presence of foreign fighters on African soil, it is equally important to reflect on the profound fragility of these states and their limited capacity to secure their territories and protect their populations. The recent attack on a Niger army base near the Malian border, where over 200 gunmen killed at least 34 soldiers (as reported by the BBC last week), reinforces these security gaps. 

In Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, al-Qaeda-linked militants killed hundreds of people in an attack in August last year, with the French government reporting 600 deaths, while the UN estimates placed the toll at around 300.

In these fragile contexts, foreign fighters have gained notoriety for grave human rights violations, surpassing even the abuses perpetrated by national armies. 

Civilians in Mali and elsewhere alarmingly fear Russian mercenaries more than terrorist groups themselves. Between May and December last year alone, the Malian army and Russian forces were reported to have deliberately killed at least 32 civilians (including 7 in a drone strike), forcibly disappeared four others, and burned over 100 homes during military operations across central and northern Mali. 

Africa can no longer afford to witness the steady loss of its vibrant population to preventable deaths. The continent must not stand by as foreign fighters tighten their grip on Africa’s security architecture. It is both ironic and regrettable that the continent depends on foreign funding for its peace operations; it must not compound this by relying on foreign mercenaries to safeguard the government of its member states and protect its civilian population.

The AU should engage with the UN Working Group and interact more with other think tanks and civil society actors involved in advancing the regulation of the activities of PMSCs in Africa and beyond. 

The continental institution must enhance the capacity of civil society actors and establish secure channels that allow them, along with the broader civilian population, to anonymously report mercenary activities. 

Their voices must be meaningfully incorporated into the review process of the OAU/AU 1977 Protocol on Mercenaries. Beyond the pressing need to review the Protocol on Mercenaries, the AU and African stakeholders must demonstrate greater commitment to advancing continental peace and security.

The African peace and security architecture must be revived to respond to current realities. The AU Peace Fund should be deployed meaningfully to support genuine peace initiatives across Africa. While counterterrorism efforts often prioritise hard power, many armed insurrections and insurgencies are rooted in deeper issues of governance, justice, and survival. 

The onus lies with Africa’s political elites at national, regional, and continental levels to craft visionary policies that address the ‘war of the belly’, ensure inclusive governance, and implement pragmatic security strategies that secure lasting peace.

Mercenaries may provide temporary security solutions, but they are ill-suited to deliver the long-term stability African societies urgently require.

Akinola is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.